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“Gate of the Sun”: Applying Human Rights Law
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in Light of
Non-Violent Resistance and Normalization
By Keren Greenblatt*
This paper is dedicated to the people of Palestine and the non-violent movement to
fight the occupation, in the hope of a better future.

I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

On January 11th 2013, approximately twenty tents and several service structures
were erected by Palestinian activists in an area in East Jerusalem, known as “E-1” or ATur.1 Later, several other tents and structures were added, and close to two hundred
activists were residing in the area.2 On the same day, the Israeli Supreme Court issued a
temporary injunction to prevent the eviction and destruction of tents that were built on the
land of A-Tur unless there was an urgent security necessity. The petitioners argued before
the court that the site was a tourist venture for the teaching of the Bedouin heritage. The
respondents argued that this was a defiant action meant to create provocation,
disturbances to public order, and riots.3 The activists released the following statement to
the public:
We, the sons and daughters of Palestine from all throughout the land, announce the
establishment of Bab Alshams Village (Gate of the Sun). We the people, without permits
from the occupation, without permission from anyone, sit here today because this is our
land and it is our right to inhabit it . . . Bab Alshmas is the gate to our freedom and
steadfastness. Bab Alshams is our gate to Jerusalem. Bab Alshams is the gate to our
return . . . This action . . . is a form of popular resistance. In the coming days we will hold
various discussion groups, educational and artistic presentations, as well as film
screenings on the lands of this village.4
The next day, the area was declared a closed military zone, and later, Israeli
security forces evicted activists from the tent village. Israeli forces submitted a statement
to the court declaring that this action fell within the urgent security necessity exception to
the injunction. More activists attempted to join the village and refused to comply with the
*

The author serves as Legal Advisor for Policy and Advocacy at the Israel Women's Network (IWN), and
has earned an LL.B from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and an LL.M from Georgetown University
Law Center. The author would like to offer special thanks for contribution and support of this article to
Prof. Jane Stromseth, Michal Sperber, Meital Nir-Tal, Prof. Michelle Ueland, Nadav Goren, John Brown,
and Jeremie Bracka.
1 HCJ 248/13 Ghanam v. Secondary Committee for the Monitoring of Construction [2013], Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription) (Isr.) [hereinafter Abu Ghanam].
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 About Bab Alsham, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/Babalshams2013/info.
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security force’s instructions to leave the area. Subsequently, rioting developed and
around twenty activists were arrested.5 The court is still waiting to hold a hearing on the
property claims over this stretch of land, and the Palestinians’ right to establish a village
on it. Meanwhile, activists continue to put up new tents each time the military forces
confiscate them.6
Bab Alshams is one of the most recent examples of the intensifying non-violent
Palestinian resistance movement. Some other examples are the weekly marches against
the security barrier (hereinafter “the Wall”) that take place in villages where the barrier
cuts people from their lands and prevents them from reaching school and work,7 the
proliferation of Palestinian films and art against the occupation,8 and the mostly
successful struggle toward statehood in the international arena.9 It is the premise of this
paper that these phenomena require a new inquiry into the balance between the law of
belligerent occupation within the framework of the international humanitarian law
(hereinafter “IHL”) and international human rights law.
In this paper I argue that the prolonged duration of the Israeli occupation of the
Palestinian territories (hereinafter “OPT”), combined with the intensifying non-violent
resistance, justifies a stronger human rights law approach, rather than an IHL approach,
in the administration of the Palestinian population and lands.
International humanitarian law and human rights law are complementary systems,
both of which aim to protect the lives, dignity, and health of human beings. Humanitarian
law is designed to apply in times of emergency (particularly in times of armed conflict).
Human rights law always applies.10 For this reason, there are certain human rights from
which governments are permitted to derogate during times of emergency, under a specific
structure of conditions. However, none of the provisions of humanitarian law can be
suspended in emergency, since it only applies in those times.11 Humanitarian law focuses
on military actions; human rights law focuses on the obligations of governments toward
individuals in their jurisdictions. Further differences between these two systems will be
explained throughout this paper, with particular emphasis on the concrete implications of
shifting from a humanitarian law paradigm to a human rights paradigm with regard to the
situation in Palestine.
There are many implications to the theoretical implementation of such a paradigm
shift. These may include the de-legitimization of the Israeli government’s use of security
as justification for human rights violations, further protection of Palestinian property
(including lands and homes), the cessation of settlement activity as a form of
dispossession and discrimination, further protection of Palestinians’ right to health,
education, freedom of movement, among others, and perhaps a new approach to the

Abu Ghanam, supra note 1.
Id.
7 See generally Background on Demonstrations in the Palestinian Territories, B’TSELEM (Jan. 2, 2013),
http://www.btselem.org/hebrew/demonstrations (documenting the many demonstrations Palestinians have
undertaken at the Wall in the past four years).
8 E.g., Five Broken Cameras, infra note 117.
9 G.A. Res. 67/19, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/19 (Nov. 29, 2012).
10 What is the Difference between Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law?, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS (Jan. 1, 2004), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5kzmuy.htm.
11 Id.
5
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human right of self-determination, eventually leading to the end of the occupation
altogether.
In the first section of this paper, I review the origins and fundamentals of the
international law of belligerent occupation and its relation to international human rights
law. In the second section, I provide a brief background of the Israeli occupation of the
OPT, particularly of the West Bank. In the third section, I review the different approaches
to what the applicable legal framework in this situation ought to be, including the Israeli
and Palestinian approaches and those of the international community. In the fourth
section, I discuss the different approaches and argue that, currently, the most persuasive
applicable legal framework is a strong human rights law approach, with a few general
norms borrowed from the law of armed conflict. In the final section, I analyze the case of
Bab Alshams in light of this proposed approach and show how this approach would have
produced radically different outcomes.
II. FROM CONQUEST TO TRUST
A. The development of the law of belligerent occupation

¶9

The law of belligerent occupation governs the relationship between an occupying
power and the inhabitants of an occupied state. According to traditional sources, the law
is applicable in situations of international armed conflict. It is important to review the
evolution of the law of occupation as a basis for later understanding the Israeli conduct in
the OPT.
¶10
The first authority to codify norms addressing occupation was the Lieber Code,12
commissioned by President Lincoln during the Civil War. This code clearly prioritized
military needs over humanitarian considerations.13 The first international attempt to
codify the law of occupation was the Brussels Declaration of 1874,14 which offered a
definition of occupation that survived into the later, better-known projects: the Hague
Conventions and Regulations of 1907.15 The definition of occupation in the Brussels
Declaration was “a territory actually placed under the authority of a hostile army bounded
by the territories around which it could establish and exercise authority.”16 The Hague
Conventions provided a detailed enumeration of customary international humanitarian
law,17 and they have reached the level of customary law themselves.18 Article 42 of the
12 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100,
Apr. 24, 1863, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS,
RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 3 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988).
13 Orna Ben-Naftali et al., Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 23 BERKELEY
J. INT’L. L. 551, 561 (2005).
14 The Final Protocol and Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of
War, Aug. 27, 1874, [hereinafter Brussels Declaration] reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 12, at
26-34.
15 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2295 (1911),
T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
16 Brussels Declaration, supra note 14, art. 1.
17 Customary international law is the set of norms that are a general practice that is also accepted as binding
law, and that exist regardless of whether they are codified in a treaty or other written form. For further
reading, see Tullio Treves, Customary International Law, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L.,
ONLINE EDITION ¶¶ 7-9 (2009), http://www.mpepil.com.
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Hague Regulations repeated almost precisely the Brussels definition of occupation.19
These instruments provided for the protection of civilians living under occupation, who
are entitled at all times to respect for their persons, honor, family rights, religious
conviction and customs, and should also enjoy protection of their private property.20
Collective punishment is forbidden,21 and several other rights and duties are prescribed.
The notion of actual authority or control by the occupying military over the occupied
population was expressed by the obligation to restore and ensure public order and safety
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws of the occupied territory.22 This
obligation has been interpreted by occupying powers and the international community as
the ability to issue and enforce directives to the inhabitants of the territory.23
In 1949, the Fourth Geneva Convention24 codified these rules once again, with
several additional norms learnt from World War II.25 Common Article 2 expanded the
scope of the laws of occupation to include situations of conflict that lack an official
declaration of war and armed resistance by the occupied population.26 The substantive
provisions of the Convention further advanced the protections of the individual rights of
the occupied population.
Article 75 of the Geneva Convention’s Additional Protocol I provided a minimum
standard of fundamental rights to be enjoyed by “persons who are in the power of a Party
to the conflict and who do not benefit from more favourable treatment under the
Conventions or under this Protocol.”27
Because these norms have developed in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, and within the context of the law of armed conflict, there is no doubt that
significant elements of this legal framework are anachronistic and require continuous
revisiting as the nature of armed conflicts around the world changes.
Today, the widely accepted28 definition of the phenomenon of occupation is the
following:
The exceptional exercise of public power by one state in a foreign territory
and over its inhabitants . . . the effective control of a power (be it one or
more states or an international organization, such as the United Nations)

Judgment of the Nuremburg International Military Tribunal (30 Sept. 1946), 22 Trial of the Major War
Criminals Before the Int’l Military Tribunal: Nuremburg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946 411, 497
(1948).
19 Hague Regulations, supra note 15, art. 42.
20 Id. art. 46.
21 Id. art. 50.
22 Id. art. 43.
23 Edmund H. Schwenk, Legislative Power of the Military Occupant Under Article 43, Hague Regulations,
54 YALE L. J. 2, 393-395 (1945).
24 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
25 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS [hereinafter ICRC], THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: BELLIGERENT
OCCUPATION (2002), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/law9_final.pdf.
26 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 24, art. 2.
27 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 75, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
28 Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 13, at 560.
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over a territory to which that power has no sovereign title, without the
volition of the sovereign of that territory.29
¶15

This definition, though not accepted by Israel, proves useful as it includes the many
different existing kinds of occupations30 and allows for a substantive analysis of the
conduct of the occupying powers, without having to struggle with how each situation,
unique as it is, qualifies as an occupation. Nevertheless, this paper will examine the
different approaches to the question of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories,
including the convoluted position that Israel has taken, which in some ways rejects the
notion of the existence of an occupation.31
¶16
The contemporary, inclusive definition revolves around the most fundamental pillar
of the law of occupation: occupation does not accord the occupant title to the territory. In
other words, it temporarily severs the link between sovereignty and effective control.32
The temporal element of occupation, although not explicitly included in this definition, is
clearly understood from the constitutive texts of the law of occupation,33 its historical
development, and the notion of the inalienability of sovereignty.34 In accordance with the
temporal element, the occupant serves as a trustee of the sovereign for the duration of the
occupation, in a manner that protects civil life.35 Although not codified in an international
instrument, this contemporary definition more closely corresponds with current
interpretations of situations of occupation and the legal framework applicable to them.36
Accordingly, it also serves recent developments in the theory of the law of occupation,
which infuse international human rights law into the application of the law of armed
conflict in different ways. These developments will be discussed in section I(b).
¶17
Some of the fundamental purposes of the law of occupation include: 1) ensuring
that civilians under the control of an occupying power are treated humanely; 2)
harmonizing these humanitarian interests with the military needs of the occupying power;
3) preventing the occupying power from imposing drastic and permanent changes in the
occupied territory’s political, economic, social and legal orders; and 4) facilitating the
prospects for a future peace agreement, which will determine the permanent status of the
territory.37 As this body of law developed, along with a parallel general shift in
international law from a sovereignty-focused system to an individual rights-focused
system, the emphasis on the military needs of the occupying power has gradually
diminished.38 In the background of the changes put into the Geneva Convention, as
EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 3 (2d. ed. 2012).
Some list as many as seventeen kinds, without being exhaustive. See Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military
Occupation: The Israeli Occupied Territories Since 1967, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 44, 51 (1990).
31 See infra section III(a).
32 Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 13, at 560.
33 E.g., Hague Regulations, supra note 15, art. 43 (which provides for the obligation of the occupant to
respect (not make any changes to) the laws in force in the occupied country).
34 Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 13, at 560.
35 Id.
36 See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 (July 9) [hereinafter The Wall Advisory Opinion]; Al-Skeini and Others
v. The United Kingdom, App No. 55721/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011); Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2005).
37 Roberts, supra note 30, at 46.
38 Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 13, at 561.
29

30

156

Vol. 12:2]

Keren Greenblatt

compared to the Hague Conventions, was the protection of the occupied civilians, rather
than facilitation of the occupant’s interests.39 This, however, does not mean that there has
been a total de-legitimization of military or security needs. It is instead a question of
balance between those needs and the rights of the protected persons.
¶18
For obvious reasons, certain occupying powers such as Israel have a vested interest
in taking a traditional and conservative approach to the applicable legal system to their
occupation. The more progressive the approach, the more the weight of the balance shifts
towards the protection of individuals. But it is not only a question of progressive versus
traditional worldviews—it is also a matter of legitimacy, international relations, policy,
and politics. The next section addresses the relationship between the law of armed
conflict and human rights law in the arena of occupation, in order to lay the groundwork
for the argument of why human rights law ought to prevail as the primary applicable
legal regime for the OTP.
B. Strange bedfellows: the relationship between the laws of armed conflict and human
rights
¶19

Recent developments in the theory, and perhaps the practice of the law of
occupation, introduce international human rights law into the application of humanitarian
law through several approaches. One approach views human rights law as the general
legal background that protects individuals at all times, whereas IHL is applied in a
situation of occupation as lex specialis.40 According to this approach, human rights law
will be called upon in cases of lacunae in the law of occupation, or for interpretational
purposes.41 Another approach views human rights law as complementary to IHL in a
more harmonious, coexistent manner.42 This approach suggests that there is no need to
“choose” the lex specialis over human rights law, but rather to look for the consistent,
harmonious application of the two systems.43 The Human Rights Committee even
suggested reversing the order and using humanitarian law to interpret human rights
provisions.44 In any case it is already well established that human rights obligations
prevail in some form in circumstances of belligerent occupation.45
¶20
One concern of applying human rights law to occupation is the underlying
requirement of sovereignty for the application of human rights obligations. The
extraterritorial applicability of human rights law remains a highly contentious debate.46
Nevertheless, and perhaps surprisingly so, it seems that there is much less controversy
when it comes to military occupation situations. Several international bodies, including

BENVENISTI, supra note 29, at 100.
Antonio Cassese, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the U.N. SecretaryGeneral, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, ¶ 143, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60
(Jan. 25, 2005).
41 Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 13, at 576.
42 See The Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 36.
43 Id.
44 U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 31, ¶ 11, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004)
[hereinafter UNHRC GC 31].
45 Noam Lubell, Human Rights Obligations in Military Occupation, 94 INTL. REV. RED CROSS 317 (2012).
46 See, e.g., Al-Skeini, supra note 36.
39

40
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the International Court of Justice (ICJ)47 have confirmed the assertion that the Occupying
Power must abide by human rights obligations as the administrator of the territory and its
inhabitants.48
Another question relevant to this complex relationship is whether most of the
human rights obligations that states or tribunals would find applicable in a situation of
occupation, considering that some obligations cannot be applied due to the constraints of
the situation and stronger IHL norms, do not already exist under the rules of IHL. One
answer to this question is simply “no.” Many of the rights enumerated in the ICESCR as
well as some civil and political rights such as the freedom of assembly, for example, are
not adequately covered by traditional IHL. Furthermore, applying human rights law adds
more than additional rights and freedoms; in general, it adds a different approach to how
a controlling power can derogate from those particular rights. This approach is much
stricter on the government and its interests and needs, and it adds, in particular, the
possibility of recourse from international human rights mechanisms,49 at the very least in
territories that are part of strong regional human rights justice systems such as the EU or
the OAS.
These questions are not simply theoretical or academic in nature. In a series of
cases brought before European tribunals, for example, the applicability of human rights
instruments came into question in situations of armed conflict and different types of
occupations. In a case brought before the U.K. courts concerning the killing of six Iraqi
civilians by British soldiers, the U.K. government contended that there is a difference
between being an occupying power for the purposes of the Hague Regulations and
Geneva IV, and having effective control for the purposes of the European Convention on
Human Rights.50 The court rejected this contention and determined that the UK was
obliged to apply the ECHR as an occupying power in Iraq.51
In the Issa case, where the court could not find as a matter of fact that the
petitioners were under the effective control of the Turkish forces, the European Court still
found as a matter of principle that even in a situation that is something less than a full
fledged occupation, a state could be held accountable for violations of treaty
obligations.52 This particular case shows that although the petitioners were not able to
meet the required evidentiary standards, the court did not avoid the contentious issue, but
rather made a strong statement with relative ease as to the clear applicability of human
rights obligations in a situation of “effective control.”53
The Human Rights Committee, in interpreting the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), also made the same contention—that the Parties to the
Covenant are required by article 2(1) to ensure the Covenant rights to all persons within
their territory, and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction. This means that a party must

The Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.Error! Bookmark not
defined., at ¶¶ 107-112; Loizidou v. Turkey, Preliminary Objections, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 62-64
(1995).
48 Lubell, supra note 45, at 319.
49 Id.
50 Al-Skeini and Others v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 26, ¶ 124 (Eng.).
51 Id. at ¶ 149.
52 See generally, Issa, supra note 36.
53 Id. at ¶ 71.
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ensure the rights in the Covenant to anyone within its power or effective control, even if
not situated within the territory of that state.54
Although there are different paths to reach the same conclusion, and although there
is now a presumption of a general applicability of human rights law, there is still a need
to understand the specific context of an occupation to determine how much and which
parts of human rights law are applied.55 In other words, what are the substantive human
rights obligations that apply to a specific situation?
It is implausible to require occupying states to uphold all of the rights enumerated
in those instruments the state is bound by. This is not even possible in a normal,
peacetime, domestic situation. Any state is constantly faced with the task of balancing
conflicting rights and freedoms in order to maintain public order. However, the literature
suggests that those rights that are de facto under the control of an occupying power
should be observed56 equally to the rights of a citizen of that state.57 One factor for the
determination of the substantive rights to be upheld in a specific situation is whether the
removed or occupied sovereign has some areas of authority that have remained under its
control.58 Such is the case with the Palestinian Authority as agreed in the Oslo Accords,
and will be discussed in the following section.
The Gaza Strip is a separate yet fascinating case study for this issue, because
although Israel had unilaterally pulled out all of its military forces from the area, and
Hamas had gained effective administrative control over the population,59 the Israel
Defense Forces (hereinafter “IDF”) maintain control over the airspace, maritime, and
land borders of the strip. In that context, Israel imposes blockades that in many cases
prevent food and medical supplies from moving in and out of Gaza, as well as the
movement of people from Gaza to the West Bank, thus seriously violating certain
fundamental human rights.
Another factor concerns certain obligations imposed on the occupying power by
IHL, such as the prohibition on introducing new penal legislation unless it is absolutely
essential for the fulfillment of the occupant’s obligations under the Convention, to
maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the
Occupying Power.60 A functioning and up-to-date criminal law system is indispensable to
the full realization of many of the rights in the main human rights instruments, such as
the rights to life, security of person, effective remedy, and equal protection of the law,61
to name a few.62

UNHRC GC 31, supra note 44, at ¶ 10.
Lubell, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.Error! Bookmark not defined., at 323.
56 Id.
57 This corresponds with the highly contentious notion that Israel is conducting an Apartheid regime by
offering different treatment to the Palestinians under its control than to the Jewish population living in the
OPT. See, e.g., Apartheid Wall: Why the Term Apartheid Embodies Historic, Present and Future of
Palestine & is a Necessary Tool for Organization and Mobilization, PALESTINIAN GRASSROOTS ANTIAPARTHEID WALL CAMPAIGN, http://www.stopthewall.org/downloads/pdf/4PageFactSheetOctober9.pdf.
58 The Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 36, at ¶ 112.
59 See infra section II.
60 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 24, art. 64.
61 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 2(3)(a), 6, 9, 26, 999 U.N.T.S.
175 [hereinafter ICCPR].
62 Lubell, supra note 45, at 326.
54

55
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Arguably, IHL provides sufficient leeway for the protection of such rights through
the “absolutely essential” exception carved out in article 64 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention63 or the duty to take all measures in the occupant’s power to ensure, as far as
possible, public order and safety in the occupied territory as provided in the Hague
Regulations.64 However, the notions of “absolutely essential” and “as far as possible”
allow the occupying power to do the minimum amount of development needed in the
occupied criminal system, and at the same time avoid taking measures that might
improve the effectiveness, efficiency and scope of the rule of law in the occupied
territory. As explained, one of the occupant’s primary obligations is to leave the occupied
legal system untouched, as it was at the moment of occupation. This provides the
occupant with the ability to easily evade its responsibilities toward the wellbeing of the
occupied population, relying on the occupant’s compliance with international law. For
this reason, among others, scholars have begun questioning whether IHL is a sufficient
and just legal framework, particularly in situations of prolonged occupation.65
¶30
Despite the positive developments toward human rights protection, both
contemporary IHL and human rights law rightfully acknowledge the security needs of the
state as a legitimate interest. For example, the Geneva Convention addresses “the
imperative necessities of security of the State”66 and the ICCPR and ICESCR allow for
certain rights to be derogated in a proclaimed state of emergency,67 and restrictions on
rights to be applied for the legitimate aim of protecting national security.68
¶31
Nevertheless, human rights law offers a specific, structured methodology with
which to scrutinize any violation or restriction that the occupant justifies with national
security needs. Specifically, where restrictions on human rights take place, the state must
meet tests of necessity, proportionality, and legitimate aims;69 a prescription by law; 70
and non-discrimination.71
¶32
As will be discussed in section IV, this scrutiny is one of the compelling reasons
for the more dominant application of human rights law in place of the more militarily
inclined IHL. Furthermore, a prevalent notion in the interpretive literature is that the
occupant cannot use its IHL obligations as justification for denying the applicability of
human rights obligations.72 This seems to be a more progressive step in the interpretation
of the relationship between IHL and human rights law in situations of occupation.
Nevertheless, it has a strong basis in the human rights instruments themselves, and it does
not follow from this assertion that the human rights obligations trump IHL in all
circumstances. Instead, this argument focuses on negating the attempts to evade the
general applicability of human rights law, despite the legitimacy of particular situations
where the occupant could not meet its human rights obligations due to the
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 24, art. 64.
Hague Regulations, supra note 15, art. 43.
65 See generally Roberts, supra note 30.
66 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 24, art. 9.
67 ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 4(1).
68 Id. art. 12(3); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art.
8(1)(a), (c), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
69 UNHRC GC 31, supra note 44, at ¶ 6.
70 ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 19(3).
71 Id. art. 4(26).
72 See Lubell, supra note 45, at 327

63
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circumstances.73 Accordingly, IHL provisions such as article 43 of the Hague Regulations
must not be used to allow occupants to avoid accountability when they choose not to take
action to ensure public order and safety74 when needed.75
¶33
The next level of this argument is the differentiation between the negative and
positive aspects of human rights obligations. Negative obligations such as refraining from
arbitrary killings, arrests, and detentions are applicable at all times. The positive
obligations, such as providing or ensuring an effective law enforcement system, are
dependent on the context of the conflict.76 Subsequently, situations of prolonged
occupation may require active intervention in order to prevent stagnation in the
economic, social and legal arenas. Thus, the duration and level of normalization of the
occupation are an imperative contextual factor to be considered.77
¶34
In order to fully understand how these different approaches may affect the
applicable legal frameworks to the OPT, the next section provides a brief overview of the
historical and legal background which led to the unimaginably complex situation in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
III. THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TALE
¶35

The basic, traditional legal framework to be applied in situations of occupation is
humanitarian law, and recent developments have introduced human rights law into the
equation, creating a complex and intertwined relationship between these two bodies of
law. Israel contends that neither of these systems applies to the Palestinian territories. In
fact, in some cases, Israeli officials have denied the actual existence of a situation of
occupation.78 Why is this? What is unique about the Israeli-Palestinian situation that
makes the applicable legal framework so contentious? This section further details the
historical and legal background that will provide a basis for the analysis of the legal
framework that ought to be applied to the Palestinian territories, and explain the
complexity of applying international law to this situation.79
¶36
In June of 1967, during what is called “The Six Day War,” the IDF gained effective
control over territories beyond the “Green Line,” which was a temporary border
delineated by the 1949 armistice agreements between Israel and its neighboring
countries.80 The international community generally saw Israel’s actions in this war as a
legitimate use of force in accordance with the self-defense doctrine, after its neighboring
countries were moving troops, removing UN peacekeeping forces, and closing the Straits
of Tiran to Israeli vessels,81 clearly preparing to attack Israel. The territories Israel gained
As was argued by the U.K. in Al-Skeini, supra note 36.
BENVENISTI, supra note 29, at 9-11.
75 Id.
76 Lubell, supra note 45, at 329.
77 Id.
78 JUSTICE EDMUND LEVY, REPORT ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF CONSTRUCTION IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA
(2012), http://www.pmo.gov.il/Documents/doch090712.pdf.
79 The historical narrative presented here is a humble attempt to present the facts as collected from a variety
of sources. However, it is important to note that any such attempt cannot encompass all possible narratives
of the history of the conflict, as narratives are a primary source of contention and the scope of this paper
does not suffice to address this complex issue.
80 BENVENISTI, supra note 29, at 203.
81 Stephan Schwebel, What Weight to Conquest, 64 AM. J. Int’l. L. 344, 346 (1970).
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in six days were three times as large as its territory on the eve of the war, and included
the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza strip acquired from Egypt, the West Bank and East
Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria.82 The Sinai Peninsula was
returned to Egypt as part of the 1979 Peace Agreement between Egypt and Israel.83 The
Golan Heights remain under Israeli control to this day; in 1981 Israel passed a law
extending its law, jurisdiction, and administration to the Golan,84 without ever expressly
stating that it was annexing the area. Nevertheless, both Israeli and international public
opinion understood this law to be an annexation.85 In the early 1990s Prime Minister
Rabin attempted to revive the possibility of returning it to Syria in case of a peace
agreement, which clearly did not come into fruition.
¶37
The Gaza Strip remained under Israeli occupation until 2005, when Israel
unilaterally evicted its entire military and civilian presence from the territory in what it
called the “Disengagement Plan.” Following the disengagement, the Hamas party won
the 2006 Palestinian elections in Gaza, and an internal conflict began between Hamas and
Fatah, the political party controlling the Palestinian Authority. Hamas then violently
eliminated Fatah elements from Gaza, and gained exclusive control over the Strip, thus
creating two separate regions of the OPT. Despite Israel’s claim that the occupation of
the Gaza Strip ended with the Disengagement, the IDF continues to control the airspace,
as well as access to the strip through land and sea. Gaza is also dependent on Israel for
the supply of fuel and electricity,86 which Israel has not always steadily provided.87
¶38
In 1967, only eight weeks after the end of the war, the Knesset adopted a law
similar to the Golan Heights Law, extending its law, jurisdiction, and administration to
East Jerusalem. Unlike the Golan, and despite harsh criticism by the international
community, including the U.N. General Assembly, Security Council, and the ICJ,88 East
Jerusalem was officially annexed when the Knesset adopted in 1980 the Basic Law:
Jerusalem, Capital of Israel.89 Subsequent to the enactment of the 1967 law, Israel offered
the Arab residents of East Jerusalem citizenship, but few accepted. Those who did not
become citizens were given permanent resident status that included the right to vote for
municipal elections and receive social security benefits.90 The municipality of Jerusalem
administers the infrastructure and school system of East Jerusalem (with alleged
discrimination),91 and finally, Palestinians residing in East Jerusalem cannot vote in
general elections.92
¶39
One of the territories that Israel acquired in 1967 is referred to as the West Bank (of
the Jordan River). The West Bank had been under Jordanian administration since
Benjamin Rubin, Israel, Occupied Territories, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L. ¶ 2
(2009), http://www.mpepil.com.
83 Id. at ¶¶ 83-88.
84 The Golan Heights Law, 5741-1981, 36 LSI 7 (1981-1982) (Isr.).
85 Rubin, supra note 82, at ¶¶ 68-76.
86 Id. at ¶¶ 64-67.
87 Ongoing Updates on the Situation in Gaza: Activity at the Crossings and Tunnels, Prices and Shortages,
GISHA (Nov. 21, 2012), http://gisha.org/updates/1832.
88 BENVENISTI, supra note 29, at 204-206.
89 Though Israel has no constitution, Basic Laws have the normative level of constitutional provisions.
90 Rubin, supra note 82, at ¶¶ 9-13.
91 E.g., Tali Nir, Social Services in East Jerusalem Are Facing Collapse, THE ASS’N FOR C.R. IN ISR. (Feb.
1, 2007), http://www.acri.org.il/he/?p=1469.
92 Rubin, supra note 82, at ¶ 10.
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194893—the year that both Israel and Jordan declared independence from the British
mandate in their respective territories. Jordan claimed that it annexed the West Bank in
1950, but this action was widely regarded in the international community, including the
Arab League, as illegal and void.94 Thus, when the IDF seized the West Bank, the
territory lacked a de jure sovereign,95 a fact that may have deep implications on any
analysis of the applicable legal framework.
¶40
In September 1993, Yasser Arafat and then Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin,
exchanged letters containing mutual recognition of the other’s existence and right to live
side by side in peaceful coexistence. Subsequently, Israel recognized the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (hereinafter “PLO”) as the representative of the Palestinian
people, and Israel and the PLO signed a “Declaration of Principles on Interim SelfGovernment Arrangements,” also known as the Oslo Accords.96 The Accords recognized
the Palestinian people’s right to govern themselves in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip,97 and, along with later Interim Agreements,98 provided for a gradual transfer of
administrative responsibilities from the IDF to a Palestinian Authority. The 1995 Interim
Agreement divided the West Bank into three areas:
• Area A includes the major Palestinian cities, and, thus, the vast majority of the
Palestinian population. These areas are under the full control of the Palestinian
Authority, in both civil and security administration.99
• Area B includes Palestinian rural communities surrounding the major cities and
is under the civil administrative control of the Palestinian Authority and the
security control of the IDF.100
• Area C includes all Israeli settlements and surrounding lands, the major roads,
military posts, agricultural areas, nature reserves, and the Judean desert. These
territories remained under Israel’s full civil and military control. They amount to
sixty percent of the West Bank, and house a population of approximately
180,000 Palestinians and 325,000 Israeli settlers.101
BENVENISTI, supra note 29, at 204.
Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3 ISR. L.
REV. 279, 289-290 (1968).
95 BENVENISTI, supra note 29, at 206.
96 Id. at 209-10.
97 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Isr.-Palestine Liberation
Organization, art. III, § 1, Sep. 13, 1993,
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Declaration%20
of%20Principles.
98 Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, Isr.-Palestine Liberation
Organization, art. II, § 1, Aug. 29, 1994,
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/Agreement%20on%20Preparatory%20Transfer%
20of%20Powers%20and%20Re.aspx; Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, Isr.-Palestine Liberation Organization, art. I, § 1, Sep. 28, 1995,
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/THE%20ISRAELIPALESTINIAN%20INTERIM%20AGREEMENT.aspx [hereinafter Interim Agreement, 1995].
99 However, since the second Intifada in 2000, the IDF has carried out arrests in these areas at its
discretion, which demonstrates Israel’s effective control over Area A as well. See BENVENISTI, supra note
29, at 211.
100 See NOGA KADMAN, ACTING THE LANDLORD: ISRAEL’S POLICY IN AREA C, THE WEST BANK 11 (2013),
http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files2/201306_area_c_report_eng.pdf.
101 See Id. at 5, 11-13.
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¶41

The Interim Agreement prohibited either party from taking any action that would
change the status of these territories and Gaza “pending the outcome of the permanent
status negotiations.”102 As is well known, Israel has since taken many actions that
changed the status of these territories by expropriating lands, approving construction and
expansion of settlements, and, of course, the construction of the security barrier, or the
Wall.103 Furthermore, following the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin and
consequent developments in the hostilities and political situation on both sides, reality did
not allow for a full realization of the process envisaged in the Oslo and Interim
Agreements.104 Accordingly, the parties have not been able to reach the anticipated
permanent status agreement.
¶42
In 2001, the Israeli cabinet adopted the first of a series of decisions to approve the
construction of a security fence.105 The Fence is also known as the security barrier or the
Wall.106 The Fence has become a major focus of legal, diplomatic, and popular
contention, particularly due to several sections that were constructed on Palestinian
territories and have caused a variety of human rights violations. This project was a
response to the wave of terrorism emanating from the West Bank in the 2000s and
prevented the infiltration of terrorists into Israel.107 However, there has been a wave of
criticism even within the Israeli system on the ulterior motives of the Wall’s construction,
namely, the expansion of settlement lands.108 Since the very first stages of its
construction, approximately two hundred cases109 have been brought before Israeli courts
demanding changes in the course of the Wall or in the policies regulating the passage of
Palestinian civilians. Some of these cases were successful.110 The construction also
brought about the ICJ’s infamous Advisory Opinion, discussed in detail below, in section
III(b).
¶43
According to data collected from the Israeli Security Agency Publications, since
2003 there has been a consistent decrease in the number of Israeli fatalities and injuries
from Palestinian terrorist and other attacks (excluding rockets and mortars from the Gaza

Interim Agreement, 1995, supra note 98, art. XXXI, § 7.
See generally KADMAN, supra note 100, at 14.
104 BENVENISTI, supra note 29, at 211.
105 Isr. Ministry of Def., Purpose, ISRAEL’S SECURITY FENCE,
http://www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/purpose.htm.
106 Among other reasons, the plurality of titles is due to the different characteristics of the barrier in
different areas. In open fields (most of the barrier’s area), it consists of an electronic fence, paved
pathways, barbed wire fences, and trenches, with an average width of 60 meters. In other locations, mostly
in densely populated areas, the barrier is a concrete wall, 6-8 meters high. See Hagit Ofran & Noa Galili,
West Bank Settlements, PEACE NOW (June 2009), http://peacenow.org.il/eng/node/297. The concrete plates
in those areas have holes on the top, which, according to representatives of the NGO “Peace Now,” were
put there to remind the population that it is a temporary measure, which will be quickly removed when
needed. Furthermore, more conspicuous means were chosen for populated areas because the fence requires
such a wide area surrounding it. However, when the barrier goes through villages, which requires
demolishing houses and other extreme measures, the security authorities’ explanation for the concrete wall
is that it is for their benefit, and that it is a wall rather than a fence.
107 Isr. Ministry of Def., supra note 105.
108 E.g., HCJ 2732/05 Head of the City Council of Azoun v. The Government of Isr., ¶ 7, [2006] (Isr.).
109 Isr. Ministry of Def., supra note 105.
110 See, e.g., HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Isr. 60(2) PD 63 [2005]; HCJ 2056/04 Beit
Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel 58(5) PD 34 [2004].
102
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strip).111 There have also been recorded decreases in the scope of terrorist attacks (as
opposed to the injuries they cause) in the years since the construction of the Wall.112
Although not all data is accessible, there has been a clear correlation between the
construction of the Wall, the decrease in terrorist attacks, and an increase in non-violent
resistance.113
¶44
The proliferation of the non-violent movement includes efforts focused on the
different aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These efforts include, inter alia,
litigation, weekly marches against the Wall,114 dialogue and reconciliation efforts,115 local
expressions of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement,116 detainees’
hunger strikes, the U.N. campaign for statehood, documentary films, and makeshift
Palestinian settlements such as Bab Alshams. The development of the non-violent
movement is likely the consequence of many factors, but the existence of a tangible,
specific issue like the Wall is an issue that Palestinians can oppose and successfully
change in the short term.
¶45
The [Palestinian] prisoners are a masculine society or subculture that praises and
glorifies the values of aggressiveness and sees nonviolence as feminine . . . the film [5
Broken Cameras]117 has exposed the prisoners to something new. They suddenly
discovered that the struggle of these “yuppies,” these “spineless” people from Bil’in and
Na’alin118 isn’t simple at all, but demands faith and sacrifice, and bears with it not a little
risk . . . The movie changed the minds of many of the prisoners regarding the nonviolent
popular struggle . . . it shook up the prisoners’ macho culture and militaristic outlook . . .
There is a ton of literature in the jails that explains and glorifies the armed struggle, but
there aren’t any books about Mahatma Gandhi, for instance, or the struggle of the
African-American citizens— Martin Luther King and others . . . this movie can help
prevent killing and fresh graves [from being dug] in this land.119
¶46
This passage is an expression of some of the underlying transformations in
Palestinian resistance culture today. As the non-violent movement continues to claim
Analysis of Attacks in the Last Decade 2000-2010, ISR. SECURITY AGENCY,
http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/EnTerrorData/decade/Fatalities/Pages/default.aspx.
112 Id.
113 B’TSELEM, supra note 7.
114 Id.
115 See, e.g., About, COMBATANTS FOR PEACE, http://cfpeace.org/?page_id=2.
116 See, e.g., Introducing the BDS Movement, BOYCOTT, DIVESTMENT, AND SANCTIONS,
http://www.bdsmovement.net/bdsintro.
117 Five Broken Cameras (Alegria Productions, Burnat Films Palestine & Guy DVD Films 2011) (a
Palestinian-Israeli documentary about the non-violent struggle against the Wall. The film has received a
great amount of attention having been nominated for an Academy award and has been screened in several
locations in Palestine, including the national Palestinian television channel. This film, as well as others that
address the non-violent movement, have also been used by NGOs in schools and other fora in both the OPT
and Israel to raise awareness to the possibility and importance of the non-violent movement and the
disastrous effects of the occupation).
118 The two villages where weekly marches take place against the Wall. Id.
119 Letter from Walid Daqa, Palestinian prisoner, to Dr. Anat Matar, Lecturer,, Tel Aviv University,
partially reprinted in Inverse Hasbara: How “5 Broken Cameras” Changed Palestinians’ Attitude Toward
Nonviolence, HA’ARETZ (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/shabahit/.premium-1.1986508
(Daqa, 52-year-old, was convicted of membership of a group responsible for the murder of an Israeli
soldier and has been sentenced to life. His sentence was recently reduced to 37 years, 27 of which he has
already served).
111

165

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

[2014

greater victories, more activists will join its ranks, which shows how it is the most
effective and equitable manner in which to fight the occupation.
¶47
Israeli security authorities see these non-violent demonstrations as a security
threat,120 and, in many cases, have used excessive crowd control measures to disperse
them, causing increasing numbers of deaths and injuries to civilians.121 The IDF regularly
declares protest venues as closed military zones to try to prevent the protests from taking
place. When they do, the military arrests protesters (Palestinians, Israelis, and foreigners)
and in some cases uses tear gas, rubber coated bullets, and other violent measures against
non-violent protesters.122 Nevertheless, the Palestinians are undeterred and continue
fighting for their rights in these demonstrations, hoping this will eventually bring a
change to their reality. This issue in particular will be further discussed in section V.
¶48
I do not make these observations on the non-violent resistance to paint a skewed
picture of reality in the region. Israel remains constantly challenged by real and
dangerous security threats to its citizens and troops.123 However, it is the complexity of
this situation, the decades of occupation and oppression, and the high toll the conflict
takes on both the Israeli and Palestinian societies that all justify continuous attempts to
offer legal, political, and social solutions that will improve it. Furthermore, the rise in the
non-violent resistance justifies taking a closer look, particularly at the possibility of
increased human rights protections.
¶49
International relations scholar Adam Roberts claims there is no need to try to prove
that any of Israel’s commitments pass an applicability test in a given situation.124 He
argues that the burden of proof to show that Israel’s IHL obligations do not apply to the
occupied territories is on Israel, and until the burden is met, the assumption is that Israel
must conform to the terms of this legal framework.125 I tend to disagree with this notion,
particularly because the Israeli-Palestinian situation is a unique one in many aspects of
international law, and thus requires further inquiry. Moreover, in light of the disputable
developments toward the application of human rights law to occupation, and the
previously stipulated need to investigate the substantive obligations in context, the
ensuing analysis is pertinent. In the following passages I summarize the different
approaches to the question of the applicable legal framework to the Palestinian territories,
including the Israeli, international, and Palestinian approaches.
IV. THE OPT CONUNDRUM: WHAT IS THE APPLICABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK?
¶50

Israel is a party to the Geneva Conventions, but as explained below, its official
stance is that the Fourth Geneva Convention does not apply de jure to the Occupied
Territories. On the opposite side of the spectrum, the international legal community has
generally rejected this proposition, and continues to maintain that the Fourth Geneva
Convention and additional IHL, as well as some human rights norms, fully apply to the

B’TSELEM, supra note 7.
Id.
122 Id.
123 ISR. SECURITY AGENCY, supra note 111.
124 Roberts, supra note 30, at 44.
125 Id.
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West Bank and Gaza.126 The following sections introduce some of the primary actors’
analyses concerning the OPT situation.
A. The confines of ambiguity: The official Israeli approach
¶51

Conceivably, the unique lack of sovereignty in the West Bank on the eve of the Six
Day War allowed Israel to maintain a vague approach to the applicable legal framework
in the West Bank, leaving sufficient doubt as to whether it was acting in contrast to
international law. This approach has developed through a complex interaction between
ever-changing government policies, Supreme Court jurisprudence including international
and domestic legal contributions, IDF and internal security policies, the military legal
system administering the OPT, and internal and external political pressures. Rather than
leading to a unified, coherent position, the democratic nature of the Israeli system has led
to a fabric of contradicting interpretations of both reality and the law.
1. The Applicability of IHL

¶52

Despite the fact that the Israeli authorities have generally administered the West
Bank in accordance with the law of occupation, the Israeli government has never
officially recognized the applicability of this body of law on the territories, with one
exception. For a brief, four-month period, the Military Commander for the West Bank
issued, and then repealed, an order that provided that military courts will observe the
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention in matters concerning judicial proceedings,
and that in case of contradiction between the order and the Convention, the Convention
shall prevail.127 In 1971, Israel’s Attorney General expressed the position that Israel
would not acknowledge the de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention,
because under Common Article 2 of the Conventions, they apply only to “occupation of
the territory of a High Contracting Party.”128 However, Israel will observe the
Convention’s “humanitarian provisions.”129 This approach has prevailed as the official
Israeli position, despite the lack of enumeration of the provisions Israel considered
“humanitarian,” and despite several contradicting court decisions, discussed below.
¶53
The Israeli Supreme Court decided in the late 1970s, shortly after the beginning of
the occupation, to apply The Hague Regulations to the OTP.130 In the same decision, the
court found that Israel’s status with regard to the “held” territories is that of an occupying
power.131 This may seem like a trivial statement, but it is important to mention in light of
recent developments in which Israeli officials have claimed that there is no occupation.132

AMNESTY INT’L, ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: THE PLACE OF THE FENCE/WALL IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 4 (Feb. 19, 2004),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE15/016/2004/en/36f9d952-d634-11dd-ab95a13b602c0642/mde150162004en.pdf.
127 Rubin, supra note 82, at ¶¶ 46-47.
128 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 24, at 17.
129 Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories, 1 Isr. Y.B. H.R.
262 (1971).
130 HCJ 610/78 Oiev and Others v. Minister of Defense 33(2) PD 113 [1979] (Isr.).
131 Id. at 115.
132 LEVY, supra note 78.
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The legal question as the court framed it was whether the petitioners, who the court
recognized as protected persons within the meaning of IHL, had standing to demand their
rights according to The Hague and Geneva Conventions. The second question was
whether the provisions in question had been adopted into domestic law. Despite earlier
decisions by the Supreme Court determining that both the Geneva and the Hague
Conventions are constitutive and not customary international law, the court now held,
relying on an article by Professor Yoram Dinstein,133 that the Hague Conventions are in
fact a codification of customary law. The Geneva Conventions, Professor Dinstein
argued, cannot be invoked in an Israeli domestic court, because they were not adopted
into Israeli law.134
¶54
Interestingly, one of the primary claims by the respondents was that all of the
Jewish settlements against which the petitioners complained were a part of the IDF’s
national defense system. Thus, the military commander’s position was that the
settlements were built due to security concerns, and only in strategically significant areas.
The court accepted this position, qualifying the entire settlement establishment as legal
and justified.135 In a concurring opinion in the case, panel Judge Landau mentioned in
particular that article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits
transferring populations into the occupied territory, is a constitutive provision. The judge
relied on commentary to the Geneva Conventions edited by Jean Pictet,136 which states
that article 49(6) “was adopted after some hesitation,” 137 implying it does not express a
well-established custom. In this case, as well as many others, the respondents argued that
they implement the humanitarian provisions of the Geneva Convention. The court
intentionally did not address this argument, because of the finding that the Geneva
Conventions could not be invoked, as they are non-customary.138
¶55
Throughout its rich history of case law regarding the occupation, the court avoided
making a clear determination on whether the convoluted official approach of the State
was an appropriate interpretation of international law. In most cases the court narrowed
its decision to the individual case before it, and found a way to apply particular IHL
provisions that the parties could agree were “humanitarian;” some of which the court also
recognized as customary international law.139 In the Ajouri Case,140 the respondents, the
Military Commander for the West Bank, claimed that the orders in question did not
violate international law because they were within the scope of article 78 of the Fourth
Yoram Dinstein, an international law scholar and Professor Emeritus at Tel Aviv University, is a
prominent authority on international humanitarian law. See Yoram Dinstein, The Verdict in the Matter of
Pithat Rafiah (HCJ 302/72 Abu Hilou and Others v. The Government of Israel), 3 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 934
(1974).
134 HCJ 610/78 Oiev and Others v. Minister of Defense 33(2) PD 113, 118 [1979] (Isr.).
135 Id. at 123-4.
136 Jean Pictet, Swiss expert on international humanitarian law, served as Vice President of the
International Committee of the Red Cross, and primary architect of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
137 4 JEAN P ICTET. COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF
CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 283 (1958).
138 HCJ 610/78 Oiev and Others v. Minister of Def. 33(2) PD 113, 126-7 [1979] (Isr.).
139 E.g., HCJ. 7015/02 Kifah Mohammad Ahmed Ajouri v. Military Commander for the West Bank 56(6)
PD 352, ¶ 13 [2002] (Isr.). It is unclear what the distinction is, according to this doctrine, between
humanitarian and non-humanitarian articles of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as the entirety of the Geneva
Conventions is a codification of international humanitarian law.
140 Id.
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Geneva Convention, relating to assigned residence and internment. Here again the
respondents quoted the long-established practice of the Israeli government applying the
“humanitarian” parts of the Fourth Convention.141 Relying on this statement, the court
assumed that the relevant provisions to the case at hand were in fact among the
“humanitarian provisions,” so there was no need to further review the validity of the
government’s interpretation of international law.142
¶56
In the same opinion, the court asserted that the forced displacement of the
petitioners was a violation of human rights. However, the court legitimized this violation
with the security justification. The court decided that the scope of the permitted violation
of human rights is determined by the law of occupation, as codified in The Hague and
Geneva Conventions.143 The court also found that article 78 is lex specialis vis-à-vis
article 49, which generally prohibits deportation and forcible transfer, rendering an
analysis of the application of article 49 unnecessary.144 It followed that the military
commander had the authority to issue his order in accordance with article 78, and there
was no “violation of human rights protected by international humanitarian law.”145
¶57
In a more recent decision from 2004, the petitioners asked the Supreme Court for
remedies for a series of human rights violations by the IDF in Gaza, caused by an active
military operation there.146 Possibly due to the urgency of the decision, as it was given
during an active situation of armed conflict, the court determined without extensive
analysis that the IDF is obliged to do everything in its power to refrain from harming the
civilian population and to ensure fundamental human rights. In the majority opinion,
Chief Justice Aharon Barak stated that Israel’s military conduct in Gaza, as far as it
concerns the local civilian population, is governed by the Fourth Hague Convention and
the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as the general principles of Israeli administrative
law.147 Justice Barak then continued to refer generally to the fundamental principles of
IHL in terms of its requirement to ensure protection of the civilian population. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Beinisch repeated the same general reference, without any
mention of the “humanitarian provisions” or the refusal of the government to apply
Geneva IV de jure.148
¶58
Although this decision applied particularly to the situation in Gaza, and involved
active conflict, the Gaza Strip was at that time still under occupation similar to the West
Bank. It is curious that the court did not repeat the government’s insistence on the
“humanitarian provisions” approach here, even though it cited previous decisions in the
same vein that emphasized the government’s narrow policy.149

141

Id.
Id.
143 Id. at ¶ 17.
144 Id.
145 Id. at ¶ 18.
146 HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human Rights and Others v. Commander of the IDF in Gaza 58(5) PD 3, ¶
4 [2004] (Isr.).
147 Id. at ¶ 11.
148 Id.
149 Id.
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¶59

Since the eruption of the second Intifada150 in September 2000 and the construction
of the Wall, there has been a natural increase in human rights litigation. In that period, the
Supreme Court gave several other decisions that were also inconsistent with the usual
position regarding the applicability of IHL.151 In an interview with a former legal advisor
to the International Law Branch of the IDF Military Advocate General, 152 the former
advisor stated that the inconsistency was also on the part of the state, whose
representatives failed in some cases to make that argument. The legal advisor added that
Israeli authorities received these decisions with a total lack of concern. He stipulated that
since the 1970s and 1980s, when making the argument on the inapplicability of the
Fourth Geneva Convention was pertinent for policy makers and State Attorneys alike,
those people have been replaced and the flood of human rights cases made them less
meticulous about it. “Now,” he added, “no one is fooling himself to think that anyone
‘outside’ will ever buy this argument.”153
¶60
Finally, in a case from 2009 concerning the conditions of detainees from the West
Bank, the petitioners argued that legal attitudes toward the Fourth Geneva Convention
have changed, and it is now considered customary international law.154 In response, the
court returns to its usual doctrine, and stated that regardless of the validity of that
argument, the judicial review of Israel’s conduct in the OPT is based on the government’s
well-established decision to apply the humanitarian provisions of the Convention as a
matter of policy. The court then stated that it should continue its long practice of
respecting the Convention’s customary provisions in its review.155 However, in her
majority opinion, Chief Justice Beinisch finally added that there was no doubt that where
there was an explicit Israeli statute that is inconsistent with international law, even if it is
customary international law, the Israeli law prevails.156
2. The applicability of human rights law
¶61

With regard to this legal framework, Israel has also presented a puzzling position.
The Almadany case157 dealt with the IDF preventing food supplies from going into a
church complex in the city of Bethlehem where Palestinian citizens and clergy were
under siege alongside a group of armed insurgents. In his decision, Chief Justice Barak
expressed the Court’s sentiment concerning the application of human rights:
¶62
The State of Israel is a state of Jewish and democratic values. We established a lawabiding state that realizes its national goals and the vision of generations, and is doing so
in recognition and actualization of human rights in general and human dignity in
particular. Between [a democratic state fighting against terrorists trying to destroy it, and
The second Intifada was the wave of Palestinian violent uprisings against the Israeli occupation. The
first Intifada took place during the 1980s.
151 See, e.g., HCJ 3799/02 Adalah—The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. General of the
IDF Central Command 60(3) PD 67 [2005] (Isr.).
152 Telephone Interview with N.K., Former Legal Advisor of Int’l L. Branch, IDF Military Advocate
General, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 18, 2013).
153 Id.
154 HCJ 2690/09 Yesh Din v. Commander of the IDF in the West Bank [2010] (Isr.).
155 Id. at ¶ 4-6.
156 Id. at ¶ 6.
157 HCJ 3451/02 Almadany v. Minister of Defense 56(3) PD 30 [2002] (Isr.).
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the recognition of fundamental human rights] there is harmony and compatibility, not a
contrast and estrangement.158
¶63
In the Physicians for Human Rights case,159 Chief Justice Barak detailed the
general principles of administrative law that accompany every Israeli soldier, and
asserted that the military must act in the territories, inter alia with fairness (substantive
and procedural), reasonableness, and proportionality while properly balancing between
individual liberties and public needs.160 When interpreting article 27 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, Barak asserted that in the core of this basic provision lay the
recognition of human value and liberty and the sanctity of human life.161 He then
compared this notion to section 1 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.162 Barak
added that the duty of the military commander is twofold; first, a negative duty to avoid
actions that harm the local civilians, and second, the positive duty to take required lawful
actions that ensure that the local civilians will not be harmed. These duties must be
carried out with reason and proportionality according to the needs in the particular
situation.
¶64
The Yassin case from 2002163 was a petition by administrative detainees against the
conditions of their detention facility. The Court found that because detainees enjoy the
presumption of innocence, not only should their conditions be comparable to those of
normal prisoners, but also that everything must be done so that their conditions will be
better. The security considerations that led to their arrest did not justify inadequate
conditions.164 The Court laid down the normative framework that governs the
determination of detention conditions—above all, the principle of human dignity as
expressed in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and the values of Israel as a Jewish
and democratic state. This normative framework tries to delicately balance the need to
ensure detention conditions that are as humane as possible, with the need to ensure the
security of the state.
¶65
Following its interpretation of the applicable statutes and regulations that applied to
the situation, the Court turned to international law. It contended that there is an
international array of provisions concerning conditions of custody, the most important of
which is in article 10(1) of the ICCPR.165 This provision expresses customary
international law according to the Court, and additionally is in line with the provisions of
Basic Law: Human Dignity. It protects the dignity of every person, including a detainee.
Furthermore, the decision cited the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons
Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.166 Even though these principles have no
Id. at 34-35.
Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 147.
160 Id. at 393.
161 Id. at 394.
162 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is the first of two laws of constitutional normative level that
provide fundamental protections to human rights in Israel. Article 1 provides: “[t]he purpose of this Basic
Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of
Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.” Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1391 LSI 150 (1992)
(Isr.)., http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm.
163 HCJ 5591/02 Yassin v. Commander of Ketziot Military Camp 57(1) PD 403 [2002] (Isr.).
164 Id. at 411-12.
165 Id. at 415.
166 ICCPR, supra note 61.
158
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direct applicability in Israel’s domestic law, they provide standards for a reasonable
governmental authority to abide by.167
¶66
Despite the lack of a clear statement, one may infer that the affirmation that U.N.
Principles do not have direct applicability in Israel means that article 10 of the ICCPR
does. The decision finally returned to the balance between individual liberty and public
safety, explaining the guiding principle in this balance: every person is entitled to his
human rights, even when in custody. Detention does not in itself deprive a person of any
right, unless it is necessary and stems from the fact of the detention or when it is
prescribed by law.168
¶67
This case is a valuable example of how the Israeli Supreme Court perceives human
rights. Although the court acknowledges that some human rights may be customary, and
that Israel is a party to the ICCPR, it refrains from expressly implementing the treaty
norms directly to the cases at hand. In order to apply, such norms need to be in line with
the domestic constitutional protections provided by the basic laws. On the other hand, the
Court deems human rights to be part of the natural law principles,169 and as such are an
official source of law to be used by the High Court of Justice.170 In the Darwish case from
1980,171 former Chief Justice Haim Cohen applied this concept precisely in his minority
opinion:
It is the right of a person in Israel, who was sentenced to imprisonment (or
lawfully arrested), to be detained in conditions that allow civilized human
life. It makes no difference that this right is not explicitly provided in any
law: this right is one of the fundamental rights of man, and in a democratic
law-abiding state it is so obvious, that it is of equal value if it were
prescribed by law.172
¶68

Notably, despite the assertion that Israel has promoted and maintained a human
rights philosophy as a fundamental pillar of its domestic legal system, it also has, since
the days of the British Mandate in 1945, been in an official state of emergency. The state
of emergency is manifested in several legislative forms, including the Defense
Regulations (Emergency)173 enacted by the British Mandate to allow it to combat the
Jewish and Arab resistance organizations during the British rule. The Regulations and
other emergency legislation contain, inter alia, vast authorities for the security sector, the
establishment and operation of military courts and security related criminal offences, and
Yassin, supra note 163, at 416.
Id. at 417.
169 § 15(c) of Basic Law: The Judiciary provides: “[t]he Supreme Court shall sit also as a High Court of
Justice. When so sitting, it shall hear matters in which it deems it necessary to grant relief for the sake of
justice and which are not within the jurisdiction of another court.” Basic Law: The Judiciary, 1110 LSI 78,
§ 15(c) (1984) (Isr.).
170 See, e.g., EA 1/65 Yardor v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee to the Sixth Knesset 19(3)
PD 365 [1965] (Isr.).
171 In the Darwish case, the court decided it was permitted to deprive security detainees from bedframes
during their detainment for fear they would use the bedframe parts as weapons. HCJ 221/80 Darwish v. The
Prisons Service 35(1) PD 536 [1980] (Isr.).
172 Id. at 538.
173 Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1442 OG (2d Ann.) 855 (1945) (Isr.).
167
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no consideration for human rights.174 The state of emergency, declared by the Knesset175
in accordance with Basic Law: The Government,176 has been renewed annually without
fail since the establishment of the state of Israel, and until May of last year.177
¶69
To the various international bodies, Israel has expressed adamant denial that the
human rights Covenants are applicable to the OPT.178 In its initial report to the Human
Rights Committee, submitted in 1998,179 Israel discussed its dualistic approach to the
implementation of treaties in its domestic law. It stated that the provisions of the ICCPR
were not adopted into the Israeli law by Knesset legislation, and so the Covenant does not
by itself create enforceable individual rights in Israeli courts. However, the basic rights
provided in the ICCPR are to a great extent already protected by domestic legislation or
case law. For this reason the government did not deem it necessary to enact implementing
legislation.180 Furthermore, the explanatory notes for the draft Basic Laws explicitly
mention Israel’s ratification of the ICCPR as a motivation to legislate those constitutional
norms.181
¶70
In addition to the written report, Israel also testified before the Human Rights
Committee, adding further explanations on the applicability of the ICCPR to the OPT.
One representative referred to the Interpretation of article 2(1) by the Legal Advisor to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It seems that the Legal Advisor accepted the prevalent
interpretation that the ICCPR was meant to apply extraterritorially for persons under that
state’s jurisdiction.182 The Israeli representative stated that the primary question is
whether the Palestinians are in fact under Israel’s jurisdiction. He added that to
complicate matters, the extent of the rights and responsibilities in the OPT was also
affected by the norms of IHL that govern the occupation, and whether such norms are
compatible with the obligations in the ICCPR.183 Israel thus took the position that there
is a clear separation between IHL and human rights law, which were each designed for
different situations, and that the IHL framework was much more appropriate for the
OPT.184 It followed that the Covenants do not directly apply to the OPT.185

174

Id.
The Knesset, the Israeli Parliament, consists of 120 seats filled by direct elections to a wide array of
political parties.
176 Basic Law: The Government, 1780 LSI 158, § 38 (2001) (Isr.).
177 Declaration of a State of Emergency, in Accordance with Article 38 of Basic Law: The Government,
1781 LSI 158 (2012) (Isr.). The State of Emergency has been renewed despite harsh criticism by a variety
of Israeli politicians, academics and civil society organizations. See, e.g., The Declaration of a State of
Emergency, THE ASS’N OF CIVIL RTS. IN ISR. (May 8, 2012), http://www.acri.org.il/he/?p=1854.
178 U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to General Assembly
Resolution ES-10/13, Annex I: Summary Legal Position of the Government of Israel, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/ES10/248 (Nov. 24, 2003), http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/A5A017029C05606B85256DEC00626057.
179 U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant: Initial Report of States Parties due in 1993, Add.: Israel, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (Apr. 9,
1998).
180 Id. at ¶ 42.
181 Id. at ¶ 43.
182 U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 63rd Sess., Sum. Rec. of the 1675th Meeting, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.
1675 (July 15, 1998).
183 Id. at ¶ 22.
184 Id. at ¶ 23.
185 Id. at ¶ 27.
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The Israeli representative also mentioned the Interim Agreements,186 which
contained a mutual commitment to human rights and the rule of law in the gradual
transfer of responsibilities from Israel to the Palestinian Authority, stating that it would
be inappropriate for Israel to account for such issues, as they were under the
responsibility of the Palestinians.187
¶72
In its second periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, Israel held to its
position that the ICCPR does not apply to the OPT, which, Israel contended, is not
subject to its sovereign territory and jurisdiction.188 In contrast to the position presented
by the Israeli Representative in the previous session, Israel seemingly returned in this
case to the interpretation of article 2(1) of the Covenant, by which the requirement for
applicability is territory and jurisdiction. Israel based this position once again on what it
called the “well-established” distinction between IHL and human rights law, and asserted
that consequently the Committee had no mandate to address events that occurred in the
OPT and were part of the conflict.189 Once again Israel referred to the transfer of
responsibility to the Palestinian authorities in accordance with the Interim Agreement,
this time claiming that the “overwhelming majority” of responsibilities in the civil sphere
were now under the jurisdiction of the Palestinians. It concluded this issue with the
determinate statement that considering this analysis, Israel cannot be held internationally
responsible for ensuring the rights of the Covenant in the OPT.190
¶73
Israel reiterated this position with identical wording in its reports to the U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights on the implementation of the
ICESCR.191
3. Parliamentary response
¶74

Several elements in Israeli society have realized that the government’s refusal to
apply the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as its international human rights
obligations, to the OPT allows it to evade many of its responsibilities toward the
Palestinian population. The response to this concern was partially manifested in a draft
bill submitted to the Knesset by Member of the Knesset (MK) Mohammad Barakke
(joined by 3 more MKs), titled “Implementation of the Geneva Convention on the
Territories Held by the Israeli Military Since the June 1967 War (2011).”192 The bill
requires that actions taken by any Israeli authority or by the Israeli military in the
territories will not deviate from the provisions of the Convention, and that any such

Interim Agreement, 1995, supra note 98.
Id. at 132, § 19.
188 U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Consideration of Rep. Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the
Covenant, 2d Periodic Rep., Add.: Israel, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2, (Nov. 20, 2001),
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/2cc0a33c394919e0c1256be9002e1188/$FILE/G0146480.pdf.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rts. (CESCR), Add. to the Second Periodic Rep.
Submitted by States Parties, Israel, 5, U.N. Doc. E/1990/6/Add.32, (Oct. 16, 2001),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f6c53ae4.html.
192 Draft Bill Implementation of the Geneva Convention on the Territories Held by the Israeli Military
Since the June 1967 War, P/18/3816 (2011) (Isr.), http://oknesset.org/bill/6428/.
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deviation will constitute a criminal offence.193 The same MKs submitted an identical draft
in 2003.194 Neither of these bills progressed in the legislative process.
¶75
In sum, although the official Israeli position suffers from ambiguity, it can be
represented in the following broad terms:
• The Hague Regulations represent customary international law and apply to the
OPT.
• The Israeli authorities, as a matter of policy, apply those provisions of the Fourth
Geneva Convention in that they consider its humanitarian provisions, but do not
apply the Convention de jure.
• The human rights instruments that Israel is a member of do not directly apply in
the domestic law and cannot be directly invoked in its courts. The government
denies applicability of any of the human rights instruments to which it is party to
the OPT. However, the Supreme Court may apply customary provisions and
general concepts of human rights law to particular cases brought to it, if there
are no contradicting domestic legal provisions, as well as no convincing security
concerns.
¶76 Many human rights are guaranteed by Israel’s domestic legislation, and can be relied on
in conjunction with international norms before the courts.
V. APPROACHES OF INTERNATIONAL BODIES
A. The United Nations
¶77

Since its earliest days, the General Assembly has passed countless resolutions
concerning the relationship between Israel and Palestine. It would be futile to review
even the best known of those resolutions in the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that
due to the political and non-legal nature of the General Assembly, these resolutions have
been directly correlated with the large number of Arab and Muslim states that have been
consistently taking an anti-Israeli position.
¶78
Particularly addressing the questions of applicability of international legal
frameworks to the OPT, the General Assembly adopted several relevant resolutions in
which it affirmed that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable to the Occupied
Palestinian Territories, including East Jerusalem, and other Arab territories occupied by
Israel since 1967,195 and called on Israel to accept de jure applicability of the
Convention.196 The General Assembly included in these resolutions reference to the
Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention held in
1999, which also adopted declarations in the same vein.197 Notably, the ICRC has also

193

Id.
Draft Bill Implementation of the Geneva Convention on the Territories Held by the Israeli Military
Since the June 1967 War, P/1175 (2003) (Isr.), http://www.knesset.gov.il/privatelaw/data/16/1175.rtf.
195 G.A. Res. 56/60, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/60 (Dec. 10, 2001); G.A. Res. 58/97, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/97
(Dec. 9, 2003).
196 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 67/119, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/119 (Jan. 14, 2013).
197 Id.
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been consistent in its position that the Fourth Geneva Convention applied de jure to the
OPT.198
The Security Council, which does possess binding legal authority, has observed this
interpretation as well. As early as 1969 it has taken the position that Israel must
scrupulously observe the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and international law
governing military occupation.199 It has subsequently reaffirmed this position in
numerous other resolutions,200 and has called upon the high contracting parties to the
Convention to ensure Israel’s respect for its obligations under the Convention in
accordance with article 1.201
With regard to the applicability to the OPT of Israel’s human rights obligations, the
General Assembly reaffirmed in its resolutions that the ICCPR, ICESCR and the CRC,
all of which Israel has ratified, should be respected in the OPT.202 The Security Council
has taken a more conservative approach, and has not made explicit statements on the
direct applicability of the human rights Covenants.203
The Human Rights Committee has expressed concern at Israel’s attitude and came
to the conclusion that in the current context, the provisions of the ICCPR do apply in the
OPT and to Israel’s conduct that affects the enjoyment of the Palestinian’s rights
enumerated in the Covenant. 204 The Committee related its position to the long duration of
Israel’s presence in the territories, Israel’s ambiguous attitude towards the future status of
the OPT, and the effective jurisdiction the Israeli security forces have in the OPT.205
As explained in section III(a)(3), Israel contended before the Human Rights
Committee that the ICCPR cannot be applied directly to the OPT by way of creating
obligations for Israel toward the Palestinian population. In response to this position,
which was replicated before the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
the Committee held the same view as the Human Rights Committee: the obligations
emanating from the ICESCR apply to all territories under the effective control of a State
Party.206

198

See, e.g., Annexe 1: Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention
Declaration, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Dec. 5, 2001) [hereinafter Statement by the ICRC],
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5fldpj.htm.
199 S.C. Res. 271, U.N. Doc. S/RES/271 (Sep. 15, 1969).
200 S.C. Res. 446, U.N. Doc. S/RES/446 (Mar. 22, 1979); S.C. Res. 799, U.N. Doc. S/RES/799 (Dec. 18,
1992); S.C. Res. 904, U.N. Doc. S/RES/904 (Mar 18, 1994).
201 S.C. Res. 681, U.N. Doc. S/RES/681 (Dec. 20, 1990).
202 See, e.g., Special Comm. to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian
People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories, Rep. of the Special Comm. to Investigate Israeli
Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied
Territories, U.N. Doc. A/66/427 (Nov. 21, 2011),
http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/66/427.
203 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1544, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1544 (May 19, 2004).
204 U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Concluding Observations: Israel, 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 21,
2003), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3fdc6bd57.html%20accessed%2021%20April,%202013.
205 U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93
(Aug. 18, 1998).
206 CESCR, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant,
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Israel, 15, 31, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.90 (June 26, 2003).
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B. The International Court of Justice
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In December 2003, the General Assembly adopted a resolution requesting the ICJ
to give an advisory opinion on the question of the legal consequences from the
construction of the Wall in the Palestinian territories, considering rules and principles of
international law.207
Israel refused to address the merits of the advisory opinion because of its
contention that the court had no jurisdiction on this matter, and even if it does it should
refuse for a variety of procedural reasons. The court analyzed each of these arguments
and concluded that it does in fact have jurisdiction, and found no compelling reason to
use its discretion so as not to issue the Opinion.208 Israel then argued that the Court could
not issue the opinion because it did not have the facts needed to make a legal
determination. The facts it was missing were, namely, the security threats the Wall was
built in a response to, and the effects that it had on the threat and on the Palestinian
population. The court found that it does have sufficient evidence to give the advisory
opinion, including information on Israel’s security concerns.209
The ICJ began its analysis with a historical account dating back to the Ottoman
Empire, and continued to establish that Israel has been de jure an occupying power in the
West Bank since 1967, based on article 42 of the Hague Regulations.210
With regards to applicable IHL norms, the Court noted that although Israel is not a
party to the Hague Conventions and Regulations, it is well established in the text of the
Hague Conventions, as well as in the Nuremburg and other tribunals jurisprudence, that
this is a declaratory instrument of universally recognized customary international law.211
With regard to the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Court noted that article 154 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that the Fourth Convention is supplementary to
section III of the Hague Regulations, which relates to situations of belligerent
occupation.212 It then noted that Israel ratified the Geneva Conventions, and did not attach
any relevant reservations.213 The Court then mentioned that the Palestinian Liberation
Organization, in the name of the Palestinian people, submitted a unilateral declaration to
Switzerland as the depositary of the Geneva Conventions that it undertook to apply the
four Geneva Conventions and the two additional Protocols.214 However, the Swiss
depositary determined it was not in a position to decide whether this declaration
constituted an accession, 215 since this was years prior to the General Assembly accepting
Palestine as a non-member State.
The court went on to analyze Common Article (CA) 2 of the Conventions in
accordance with the law of treaties, in response to Israel’s argument that it does not apply
the Fourth Geneva Convention de jure due to CA 2’s requirement that the occupied
G.A. Res. ES-10/14, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/14 (8 December, 2003).
The Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 36, at 14-54.
209 Id. at 55-58.
210 Id. at 70-78.
211 Id. at 89.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 91.
214 Id.
215 1949 Conventions and Additional Protocols, and their Commentaries, ICRC,
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreaties1949.xsp.
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territory is of a High Contracting Party.216 The first paragraph of CA 2 requires two
conditions for the Conventions to apply: (1) an armed conflict and (2) that the conflict is
between two Contracting Parties.217 However, the following paragraph, as determined by
the Court, was not meant to restrict applicability when the occupied territory is not of a
Contracting Party. It was rather intended to clarify that the Convention still applies even
when the occupation is met with no armed resistance.218 This interpretation is confirmed
by the drafters’ intent to protect civilians under occupation regardless of how the
occupation came into existence, as demonstrated in the Convention’s records of
negotiations.219
¶89
In its ultimate finding that the Fourth Geneva Convention fully applies to the OPT,
the court also awarded significance to the fact that the High Contracting Parties to the
Geneva Conventions, the ICRC, as well as the U.N. General Assembly and Security
Council, have all issued statements and resolutions since 1967 asserting the same
position.220
¶90
Subsequently, the Court continued with an analysis of the applicability of human
rights law to the OPT, relying heavily on its previous Advisory Opinion on the issue of
nuclear weapons.221 First, in the nuclear weapons Opinion, the Court found that the
protection of the rights provided by the ICCPR does not cease in times of war, unless
derogated through the specific procedure and requirements in article 4 of the Covenant.222
Second, the Court provided an analysis of the extra-territorial applicability of the ICCPR,
including the different approaches expressed by other international bodies, as reviewed in
the previous sections.223 It concluded that the ICCPR not only applies in conjunction with
IHL, but also provides for extra-territorial applicability in situations of effective control,
such as the OPT.224
¶91
The Court finally addressed the ICESCR and the CRC, and concluded that in these
cases too, Israel is bound by its obligations under the Conventions in the areas where it
exercises jurisdiction, and is required to lift any obstacle to the enjoyment of these rights
in areas where the Palestinian Authorities have jurisdiction and control.225
C. The Palestinian approach
¶92

In the written statement submitted by the Palestinians to the ICJ for its Advisory
Opinion on the Wall, the Palestinians contended first that Israel remains the occupying
power of the Palestinian Territories, even after the transfer of certain areas and

The Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 36, at ¶¶ 94-95.
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 24.
218 The Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note36, ¶¶ 94-95.
219 Id.
220 Id. at ¶¶ 97-99.
221 Id. at ¶¶ 105-106; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996(I) I.C.J. 226 (Jul. 8, 1996) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion].
222 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, ¶ 24.
223 The Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 36, at ¶¶ 107-110.
224 Id. at ¶ 111.
225 Id. at ¶¶ 112-13.
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responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority.226 They further argue, relying on the ICRC’s
determination,227 that as the occupying power Israel must comply with the provisions of
the Fourth Geneva Convention with regard to the protection of the Palestinian
Population.228
¶93
Notwithstanding the obligations under the laws of occupation, the Palestinians
argue that this application does not nullify international human rights law, which is
binding on Israel in its conduct in the OPT.229 The Palestinians also acknowledge that in
certain circumstances such as armed conflict, some human rights can be lawfully
violated, but only when certain conditions are met, as laid out in the human rights
Covenants.230 The Palestinians then turn to apply this proposition to particular actions
Israel took in the context of the Wall, including in their analysis concepts such as the
duties to examine alternatives231 and to cause the least possible harm to human rights,232
as well as using legitimate versus extraneous considerations in planning the Wall’s
route.233 Finally, the Statement concludes with an enumeration of many of the rights that
were expected to be violated by the construction, including the right to work, health,
education, family and social life.234 By erecting the Wall, Israel evades its obligation to
protect Palestinian human rights, and thus is in breach of international law.235
D. Discussion
¶94

The Israeli argument that the Geneva Conventions only apply to occupation of the
territory of a High Contracting Party is not convincing. Common Article 2 also provides
in its third paragraph that:
¶95
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual
relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said
Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.236
¶96
In its simplest interpretation, this paragraph requires a High Contracting Party to
apply its rules even to a non-contracting “power,” as long as the latter accepts and applies
the provisions of the Convention. Furthermore, it has been suggested that based on the
Palestinian’s right to self-determination, although they did not at the start of the
occupation have a government with official title to the territory, sovereignty lies in the
people, not in a government.237 In this sense, the notion that the Palestinian people were
226

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: (Request for
an Advisory Opinion), INT’L CT. OF JUSTICE 27 (Jan. 30, 2004), http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/131/1555.pdf [hereinafter Written Statement by Palestine].
227 Statement by the ICRC, supra note 198, at ¶ 2.
228 Id.
229 Written Statement by Palestine, supra note 229.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 28.
232 Id. at 31.
233 Id. at 31-38.
234 Id. at 39.
235 Id.
236 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note, 24.
237Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 44 HARV.
INT’L. L. J. 65, 97 (2003).
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the de facto sovereign of the land prior to the occupation further weakens the Israeli
argument that the lands had no sovereign.238 Finally, it seems that Israel stands alone in
its insistence on this evasive approach, when there is an apparent consensus in the
international community that at the very least, the Fourth Geneva Convention applies de
jure to the OPT.
From the review in section I of the development of the law of occupation, it is clear
that throughout the past two hundred years, this body of law has evolved in a very
particular trajectory—that is, an increasing emphasis on protection of the individual
rights of a civilian population. The most recent development views the human rights
framework as a complementary one in cases of lacunae or interpretational challenges. It
seems only natural that the next link in the chain will be a full implementation of human
rights law, with some limited derogations or restrictions due to the unique circumstances
of the occupation. Such restrictions would be subject to the highest scrutiny, and could
not be easily justified by general security claims without requiring the state to provide
adequate, specific reasoning that meets the standards set out in the human rights
Covenants, including necessity, proportionality, legitimate aim, and nondiscrimination.239
It seems that the main thrust of international legal and scholarly attempts to address
the grave human rights situation in the OPT is calling Israel to fully comply with its
obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention.240 One more progressive suggestion by
an Israeli scholar, in addition to the Fourth Convention, was to use the human rights
instruments as a guide for the occupant in the administration of prolonged occupation,
just as civilian governments would in administering their own territories.241 Another
creative suggestion was for the international community to declare time limitations on the
possible duration of occupation, and possibly even to transfer the administration of an
occupied territory when it exceeds that time limit to an international authority.242 In my
view, fully applying the Fourth Convention as well as these creative suggestions are all
insufficient responses.
Without a permanent peace agreement, the occupation will not come to an end.
Until that day, I propose implementing human rights law as the primary legal framework,
and administering the OPT through a substantive human rights lens. This will at the very
least alleviate some of the harsh burdens of the occupation, and effectively catalyze a
lasting solution that will end the occupation.
As reviewed in section I(a), the law of occupation has been advancing toward
incorporation of human rights law in conjunction with IHL. In addition to the fact that an
increasing number of interpreters of international law accept that the primary human
rights instruments apply to Israel’s conduct in the OPT, these developments strengthen
the argument that some form of international human rights law is applicable to this
occupation. However, one of the problems is that none of the bodies that have asserted

Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 13, at 568.
See, e.g., Sidiropoulos v. Greece, App. No. 26695/95, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. (Jul. 10, 1998),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58205 (The European Court of Justice analysis
of Greece’s violation of the freedom of association protected by the ICCPR).
240 See supra section III(b).
241 ROSALIND COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 1967-1982 29 (1985).
242 Ben-Naftali et al, supra note 13, at 613.
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this view has provided coherent, practical guidance on how they expect Israel to
practically apply these two legal frameworks concurrently.
In a way, the Israeli Supreme Court has attempted to utilize this approach in several
cases through the existing Israeli notions of the role of human rights in Israeli law. 243 The
Supreme Court has ample experience in harmonizing several sources of law that lack an
internal hierarchy when there are no clear answers in statutes. These sources include
Jewish law, common law, customary international law, and general concepts of natural
law.244 Nevertheless, the Court’s application of human rights norms vis-à-vis domestic
security and emergency regulations to this day has proved inadequate for the broad
protection of the rights of the Palestinians.
The co-application of IHL and human rights law is understandably unclear, since it
is a relatively recent development. But in the context of the Palestinian Territories, I
argue more than simply to say that human rights should be the primary legal framework
for Israel’s conduct. I argue that Israel ought to adopt a multi-faceted approach in which
it (1) directly applies its international human rights obligations to the OPT; (2) applies
specific IHL notions to provide the conceptual foundation and authority for its
administration of the OPT; and (3) subjects its derogations, restrictions and violations of
human rights to judicial review, in accordance with the methodology provided by the
human rights Covenants. When scrutinizing the conduct of Israeli authorities and security
forces, the Israeli Court would be able to use as guidance the abundance of jurisprudence
developed by international tribunals in their ICCPR related decisions.
It would not be beneficial to exclusively apply human rights law to the OPT.
Several of the fundamental concepts and provisions of IHL may prove useful to
accommodate to the context of this situation. Generally, the concepts and provisions that
ensure a future viable realization of the Palestinian right to self-determination, without
diminishing from the responsibility of Israel to safely and justly administer the OPT, are
the ones to be infused into the primary human rights construct. A few prime examples are
the fundamental authority of the occupant to administer; the non-transfer of sovereignty
and prohibition of annexation; the prohibition on the transfer of population; and the
prohibition of unessential legislation, in order to maintain the continuous reminder of the
temporal element of the occupation.245 With respect to legislation, the interpretation of
“essential” should be extended through a human rights perspective as a guiding principle,
to include economic, social and cultural rights.
In addition to the simple injustice of Israel’s deficient protection of the Palestinians
with its existing evasive approach, in the following passages I offer several additional
arguments as to why adopting human rights law as the primary framework for the OPT is
the preferable approach. First, IHL provides an insufficient degree and method of
scrutiny of violations; second, Israel’s use of security justifications for human rights
violations is inherently invalid in the OPT context; third, the proliferation of the nonviolent movement further undermines security justifications; fourth, the scope of the
requirement of non-discrimination provided by IHL is not as wide or as inclusive as its
parallel requirement in human rights law; fifth, the prolonged duration of this occupation

See, e.g., Yassin, supra note 163.
Law on the Fundamentals of the Law, 5740-1980, 978 LSI 163 (1980) (Isr.).
245 Roberts, supra note 30, at 46.
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justifies a human rights approach; and, finally, a forward-thinking strategy by Israel
would justify adopting this approach.
1. The Degree of Scrutiny
¶105

The drafters of the Fourth Geneva Convention had the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights in mind, and included far-reaching individual rights protections.246
However, the drafters designed the Fourth Geneva Convention to protect the civilian
population in a short, temporary state of occupation,247 and did not provide adequate
means to hold the occupant accountable for violations that may not rise to the level of
grave breaches of the Convention.
¶106
The Geneva Conventions specify which of their provisions constitute grave
breaches, and require States Parties to enact criminal legislation to punish persons guilty
of war crimes.248 The Conventions also establish universal jurisdiction for these war
crimes.249 A few examples of acts that constitute grave breaches of Geneva IV when
perpetrated against a protected person are willful killing, torture, willfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation and willful, unlawful,
and extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military
necessity.250
¶107
Without analyzing whether Israel has committed war crimes, one major issue is the
improbability of international prosecutions against Israeli officials for political and
jurisdictional reasons.251 Even if we set aside Israel’s alleged impunity for grave
breaches,252 IHL does not provide a sufficient system of accountability or enforcement
for much of Israel’s adverse daily conduct in the OPT. Arguably, the majority of this
conduct does not rise to the level of war crimes, but definitely constitutes human rights
violations. A human rights approach would be able to effectively, and less dramatically,
address these issues.
2. Security Justifications
¶108

The Israeli government currently justifies the military’s human rights violations
with security needs253 that, as demonstrated in section V, would not survive the scrutiny
provided by the human rights Covenants. The existential security threat to the state of
COHEN, supra note 241, at 29.
Id.
248 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 24, art. 146.
249 Id.
250 Id. art. 147.
251 There have been several attempts by states to invoke universal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Belgium Opens
Way for Sharon Trial, BBC (Jan. 15, 2003), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2662635.stm (Belgium’s
attempt to prosecute former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon for alleged war crimes during the Lebanon war in
the 1980s).
252 See, e.g. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Rep. of the Ind. Int’l. Fact-Finding Mission to Investigate the
Implications of the Israeli Settlements on the Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the
Palestinian People Throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/22/63 (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session19/FFM/FFMSettlements.
pdf.
253 See id.
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Israel that could justify continuing to oppress the Palestinians has long been gone. The
argument is not that there is no threat. Rather, it is for three primary reasons that the
existing security concerns do not justify clinging to the minimum standards of IHL
protection.
1. The nature of the threat does not rise to the level of hostilities envisioned
by IHL in order to justify suspending ordinary human rights
protections;254
2. The security concerns balanced against the rights of the Palestinians
include protection of the settlements, themselves a breach of IHL;255 and
thus,
3. The occupation itself is the cause, as well as the target, of the security
threat.
¶109
In this situation, the occupation itself has become the embodiment of the armed
conflict rather than a side effect. For this reason the occupation cannot be used as
justification for applying a lesser form of protection to a population that has the right to
self-determination. The normalization of the situation of conflict perpetuates a constant
state of emergency that allows for restrictions and derogations from what has become the
fundamental basis of international law—the protection of human rights. A progressive
approach that only borrows the most essential norms from IHL, and in all other instances
ensures the protection of human rights, will advance the goal of ending the occupation,
while restricting rights only at the presence of a specific and imminent security threat or
other legitimate circumstances, as provided by human rights law.
3. The Non-Violent Resistance
¶110

As discussed in section II, non-violent resistance has become increasingly prevalent
in the OPT. Conceptually, this movement is a component of the process of normalization.
The longer an occupation lasts, the further it moves from a high-intensity armed conflict
to a normalized situation of perpetual oppression. Conceivably, the resistance movements
have undergone a parallel process of shying away from armed conflict and turning to
other, legitimate methods. This could be attributed to the effectiveness of the Wall and
other thwarting efforts by Israeli security, but it could also be seen as a societal change in
trend.
¶111
Be that as it may, when juxtaposed with the degree of oppression and rights
violations, the non-violent activities significantly undermine Israel’s claims of continuous
threats to its existence both toward the international community, and within the Israeli
and Palestinian societies.
¶112
In contrast, by applying a human rights framework, Israel’s ability to derogate
human rights in the name of security would be considerably narrower, and would be
subject to the requirements of non-discrimination, necessity, proportionality, and would
require a nexus between the actions taken and the asserted legitimate aim.

254 See, e.g., A v. Sec. of State for Home Dept., [2004] UKHL 56, ¶ 97 (appeal taken from Eng.)
(explaining why terrorist violence does not threaten the life of the nation, hence does not justify derogation
from the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention).
255 Ben-Naftali et al., supra note 13, at 591.
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4. Non-Discrimination
¶113

Currently, the Israeli legal system applies fully to the settlers in the West Bank. The
Palestinians, on the other hand, are confined by the limitations of the military regime and
its inconsistent application of certain IHL norms. This is an inherently discriminatory
situation, for which IHL does not provide a proper solution.
¶114
The principle of non-discrimination appears not only in the human rights
instruments, but also in the Fourth Geneva Convention as a fundamental basis of
application of the other substantive rights.256 However, the meaning of nondiscrimination in the Geneva context is non-discrimination in the application of the
Convention itself, among protected persons.257 Furthermore, in his commentary, Jean
Pictet explicitly mentions that although the enumerated categories of discrimination are
not exhaustive, discrimination on the basis of nationality was intentionally not
included.258 In other words, applying a minimal standard of protection in accordance with
IHL to a population of one nationality, and a higher standard of protection in accordance
with national law and international human rights to people of another nationality, does
not constitute a violation of IHL.
¶115
In contrast, human rights law provides a much stricter requirement of equality
before the law and prohibition of discrimination on any grounds, including national
origin.259 It also specifically requires non-discrimination in the application of the rights of
the Covenants, without derogation under any circumstances on the rights to life, freedom
from torture, cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment and freedom of thought, conscience
and religion.260 If applied, this framework, as opposed to even the highest standard of
IHL, can provide for an entirely different reality for the Palestinians if their rights are
equalized to those enjoyed by the settlers, in accordance with the principle of nondiscrimination.
5. Prolonged Occupation
¶116

Both concepts of military necessity and humanitarian concerns may, and ought to
have, different manifestations in situations of active combat vis-à-vis occupation.261 The
situation of prolonged occupation further reflects the conclusion of intense combat within
that territory,262 and the transition to a situation of maintenance until a resolution to the
underlying conflict is reached.
¶117
Why then is there a fundamental problem with applying only the law of occupation
framework? The reason most scholarly opinions, as reviewed in this paper, conclude at
least some form of human rights application rather than adamantly adhering to IHL, is
that traditional laws of occupation are in a sense a means to perpetuate the occupation,
thus achieving its opposite goal. They do so through the set of rules designed to keep
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 24, art. 27.
PICTET, supra note 137, at 206.
258 Id.
259 ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 26.
260 Id. art. 4.
261 MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE
LEGAL REGULATION AND INTERNATIONAL COERCION 739-740 (1961).
262 Id.
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things as they are, based on the anachronistic nineteenth century notions of short-term
occupation in the midst of a full-fledged war.
¶118
The understanding that the administration of an occupied territory should develop
over time and acclimate to a situation of prolonged occupation is not new. Scholars as
early as 1916 have asserted that the occupant must administer the territories as if they
were in conditions of peace, and that in prolonged occupation, new legislation is
essential.263 Although fully applying the Fourth Geneva Convention to the OPT would be
a positive first step, it is clearly insufficient264 after 45 years of oppressive military rule.
¶119
This argument supports the conclusion that a human rights framework would be
more appropriate for the conditions of a prolonged occupation such as the OPT, because
it would provide a fundamental basis for the life of the Palestinian population which is, or
should be, more similar to a state at a time of peace than to a state in a situation of war.
6. Strategic Policy
¶120

Israeli policy makers ought to adopt a forward-looking strategy. They ought to
understand the possible implications of continuing to oppress the Palestinian population
until the day the occupation ends, considering terrorism and violent resistance are mostly
focused on ending that oppression. By applying human rights law and consequently
improving their lives, Israel can ensure the Palestinians will be better prepared for a
substantive democracy based on the rule of law when they assume full independence.
¶121
In a sense, this strategic approach could lower the security threat to Israel when it
will no longer be able to control the society it has been oppressing. Furthermore, it will
allow the Palestinians to develop a viable economy, and focus their efforts on building
the physical and conceptual infrastructure for their future independence, instead of
focusing on resistance. Consequently, this could reduce threats to Israel's security in
the short term as well.
¶122
Notably, the human rights approach not only provides a stronger protection to the
fundamental rights of the Palestinians, but it also assigns positive obligations and
responsibilities to Israel to assist the Palestinians in preparing for independence. This
includes, for example, helping in the design and training of effective law enforcement;
preparing viable justice, taxation and social security systems; and establishing adequate
health care facilities that are easily accessible and geographically widespread.
7. Challenges
¶123

Finally, it is important to note some major challenges for the adoption of the human
rights approach. First is the ineffectiveness of U.N. General Assembly and Security
Council resolutions in changing Israeli conduct. Even if these bodies adopt hundreds of
resolutions calling on Israel to comply with its human rights obligations in the OPT, they
do not have the power to change Israeli policy. Second, this approach is not codified in
any international instrument. As long as it exists only in academic papers, or even judicial
opinions, Israel is not likely to see itself as bound by it, and would rather maintain its
A. Leurquin, The German Occupation of Belgium and Article 43 of the Hague Regulation of the 18th
October, 1907, 1 INT’L. L. NOTES 55 (1916); MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE
225 (1959).
264 COHEN, supra note 241, at 29.
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convoluted approach and protect its political interests. Conceivably, the major human
rights instruments could in the future add provisions explicitly stating that they apply in
times of armed conflict, and that particularly in situations of prolonged occupation, they
have primacy over IHL. However, this kind of codification is unlikely to take place
quickly if at all, considering the difficulty of reaching agreement in such important
multilateral treaties.
¶124
Third, even if international and regional tribunals adopt this approach in their
jurisprudence, their decisions are not binding to Israel. Such decisions could only be used
as supporting sources for the interpretation of human rights law in Israeli courts. In
addition to the improbability that this proposal would ever be adopted in full by the
Israeli government, it suffers from an enforcement challenge. Israel is not a member of
any regional organization, and cannot be held accountable by any of the existing human
rights judicial bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights.
¶125
This challenge is no different from a scenario in which Israel applies the Fourth
Geneva Convention de jure, since it is also not a member of the International Criminal
Court for individual prosecutions, and generally does not accept the jurisdiction of the
ICJ for state level adjudication.265 With the exception of the universal jurisdiction option,
the only tribunal that could practically hold Israeli authorities, officials and military
personnel accountable for violations in accordance with human rights law standards is the
Israeli Supreme Court. However, in order to change the Court’s application of law on
Israel’s conduct in the OPT, a major policy shift would need to occur in the Israeli
government. In the conclusion of this paper I further discuss how such a change could be
advanced within the confines of the current system and political climate.
V. BAB ALSHAMS
¶126

Evidently, the proposed approach has the potential of significantly changing the
socio-political landscape in the OPT. Following is a brief analysis of how this approach,
if applied by the Israeli Supreme Court, could have produced a different result in the case
of the Bab Alshams activists.
¶127
The right to freedom of peaceful assembly is guaranteed in article 21 of the
ICCPR,266 and also echoed in article 8 of the ICESCR.267 It is not one of the absolute
rights, and can be subjected to certain restrictions if they meet all of the following
conditions:268
1. The restrictions are prescribed by law,
2. They are necessary in a democratic society, and
3. They are in the interests of a legitimate aim, i.e. national security, public
safety, public order, public health or morals or the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.269
See supra section III(b).
ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 21.
267 ICESCR, supra note 68, art. 8.
268 U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful
Assembly and of Association, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/27 (May 21, 2012) (by Maina Kiai) [hereinafter
Report of the Special Rapporteur].
269 Id.; ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 4.
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Furthermore, in adopting laws that restrict this right, the right must be the rule and
the restriction the exception.270 Consequently, the state is obliged to only place
restrictions that are proportionate to the pursuance of the legitimate aim.271 According to
article 4 of the ICCPR, in a state of emergency, certain rights can be derogated if the state
can show that the situation constitutes a threat to the life of the nation, and that any
derogation is strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.272 The Human Rights
Committee determined further that although freedom of assembly was not included in
article 4 as one of the rights that cannot be derogated in a state of emergency, the
possibility of restricting freedom of assembly under the terms of article 21 is sufficient.273
Thus, any derogation from the right to freedom of assembly could not be justified by the
exigencies of a state of emergency.274
In the past few years, since the increase of demonstrations against the Wall, the
IDF has taken a variety of actions to quell the demonstrations. These include arresting
organizers and participants, use of crowd-control measures to disperse protesters, and
issuing orders declaring the protest venues closed military zones.275
In 1967, the military commander of the West Bank issued an order prohibiting
“incitement and hostile propaganda actions” by Palestinians,276 which includes vast
discretion for military commanders and imposes restrictions on the freedom of assembly,
expression and other rights.277 The Order is used to this day to charge, investigate, and
arrest activists.278
Despite statements by military personnel that restrictions are only placed on violent
demonstrations, in reality the Order allows for the military commanders to prevent some
protests from taking place before they even begin—for example, by refusing to grant
permits or arresting protesters the night before a demonstration is planned.279
As explained in the introduction to this paper, in the case of Bab Alshams the IDF
was able to evict the activists through a security necessity exception provided by the
Court in its injunction prohibiting eviction.280 This happened without regard to the fact
that prior to the arrival of the security forces, the village was conducting peaceful
activities and rioting only began after the forces started arresting the activists.281
Does the eviction of Bab Alshams activists meet the conditions required by the
ICCPR? First, the military commander in the West Bank has the legal authority to declare
an area a closed military zone and take measures to restrict protests in accordance with
Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 268, at ¶ 17.
UNHRC GC 31, supra note 44, at ¶ 6.
272 U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations During a State of
Emergency, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001).
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 B’TSELEM, supra note 7.
276 Order No. 101, Order Regarding Prohibition of Incitement and Hostile Propaganda Actions (Aug. 27,
1967) (Isr.),
http://www.btselem.org/download/19670827_order_regarding_prohibition_of_incitement_and_hostile_pro
paganda.pdf.
277 Id.
278 B’TSELEM, supra note 7.
279 Id.
280 Abu Ghanam, supra note 1.
281 Id.
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the laws of occupation and Order 101. This means that the IDF’s actions were prescribed
by law.
Second, in accordance with the Human Rights Committee General Comment 29
and the report of the special rapporteur, restricting the right to freedom of assembly
cannot undermine the democratic concepts of pluralism, tolerance, and
broadmindedness.282 This means that despite meeting the legitimate aim requirement, the
IDF would not be able to use security necessity as a blanket justification to quell every
anti-occupation assembly. Rather, it would need to prove to the Court in each case that
the threat to security or public order outweighs the obligation to protect the freedoms of
assembly and expression.
In this case, the IDF claimed that there is an actual probability that allowing the
activists to remain in the area would lead to severe disturbances to the public order. In
reality, although the respondents were right that the site became an attraction to dozens of
other activists, the site is in fact located on a hill in an open, unpopulated area,283 and any
violent action by protesters was done in the context of resisting arrest. Hence, in applying
the correct balance through the human rights approach, the IDF’s claims of threats to the
public order would not have been accepted.
It can also easily be argued that declaring the area a closed military zone, evicting
all the protesters, and arresting many as a response to the erection of twenty tents on a
secluded hill is an astoundingly disproportionate response.
In light of this analysis, the Court would have had to render the eviction unlawful,
instruct the IDF to allow the reestablishment of the village, and possibly even order the
military to compensate the organizers, particularly those who were arrested.
VI. CONCLUSION

¶138

This paper offers a contextual approach to the Israeli-Palestinian situation, relying
on the contemporary notion that human rights law generally applies to occupation. I have
attempted to persuade the reader that due to the increasing prevalence of non-violent
resistance, and the uniquely long duration of the occupation, an approach where the
primary legal system is human rights law, and IHL is secondary, is the appropriate
application of international law to the Palestinian Territories. The backward reality of this
conflict is that the occupation itself has turned into the embodiment of the armed conflict,
rather than being simply a side effect. This was somehow normalized into a long-standing
situation of oppression of human rights in the OPT. Applying human rights law first, with
the addition of IHL concepts detailed in the discussion above, seems to be the most
adequate response to the injustice.
¶139
Considering Israel’s decades of refusal to apply the Fourth Geneva Convention to
the OPT, it is extremely unlikely that the proposed, highly progressive approach will be
adopted by Israel. In a sense, there is an advantage to develop such theories in an
academic setting, free from the confines of pragmatism and politics. For example, in an
imagined ideal future where the independent, democratic state of Palestine lives
peacefully beside the de-militarized state of Israel, those two states could have a special
tribunal for human rights, which would serve as an appeals chamber for the Supreme
282
283
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Courts of both states in matters concerning the application of their international human
rights obligations. This of course is an unrealistic vision for the future, and might take a
hundred years until we reach that point in the region. On the other hand, there are several
realistic scenarios in which the proposed approach could be partially applied, and still
significantly improve the state of human rights in the Palestinian Territories.
One possibility is through litigation within the Israeli system. Although under the
leadership of the new Chief Justice Asher Grunis the court is currently more
conservative, there have been many groundbreaking cases that modified the conduct of
the authorities in the OPT, including the torture decision,284 decisions changing the
course of parts of the Wall,285 and the decision against the use of human shields.286
Attempting to change the applicable legal system through Supreme Court litigation
is quite a challenge, and definitely cannot be done in a broad, general sense. But it can
change certain practices in the conduct of Israeli authorities, if increasing numbers of
human rights violations cases will be brought before the court in which the arguments are
persuasively based on this conceptual foundation. Furthermore, such arguments would
need to be supported by a variety of international and comparative jurisprudence and
legal literature. This would mean that as a first step, this proposal would have to be
further developed by academics, international bodies, and judicial opinions elsewhere.
Another possibility is through the inevitable accomplishment of a permanent peace
agreement. In this scenario, similarly to the way the Oslo Accords were designed, the end
of the occupation will not happen instantly, but will rather be a gradual process of
transferring responsibilities. In the framework of such an agreement, it is quite plausible
to require that until full responsibilities are transferred to the Palestinian government,
Israel will use human rights law as the primary basis for administering the territories it
has control over, while complementarily incorporating the previously discussed necessary
IHL concepts. This would mean that during the transition period, the Israeli authorities
(both military and civil) will have to administer the territories without discrimination, and
with a much higher degree of human rights protections for the Palestinian people, while
continuously preparing the ground for a fully independent and democratic Palestinian
government. In this period the Israeli authorities would also be subject to a human rights
level of scrutiny.
In applying this approach to the transition period (as well as prior to that time,
depending on successful litigation and policy changes), the Palestinian people are likely
to become more aware, reliant and demanding of human rights, once their own
government will take full control. The benefit of introducing the Palestinians to a higher
level of protection of their fundamental rights is that they will consequently not allow
their own government to deviate from a democratic, rule of law model. In turn, the
Palestinian government will be forced to maintain the level of protection of the citizens of
Palestine. In this optimistic scenario, Palestine could become the most progressive and
human rights-oriented state in the Arab world, leading the way for further reforms in
other countries.
HCJ 5100/94, Public Committee Against Torture in Isr. et al. v. Gov’t of Isr., 53(4) PD 817 [1999]
(Isr.).
285 See Beit Sourik, supra note 110.
286 HCJ 3799/02 Adalah—The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Isr. et al. v. GOC Central
Command, IDF et al. 60(3) PD 67 [2005] (Isr.).
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¶144

Finally, in further developing these ideas, there are many more questions that ought
to be examined. These include, for example, the effects of the U.N. General Assembly
recognizing Palestine as a non-member state287 on the possibility of Palestine acceding to
the Geneva Conventions, thus possibly changing Israel’s ability to claim the territories
have no sovereign. A more inclusive and in-depth analysis of how the human rights
approach would affect the different aspects of the occupation, and whether this approach
could be applicable to other situations in the world would also be beneficial in
strengthening its legitimacy as a development in international law. Another inquiry to be
considered is developing a detailed set of guidelines for applying IHL and human rights
law harmoniously, including precise provisions, interpretations, and a hierarchy between
the two frameworks in particular situations.288
¶145
In any case, there is no doubt that academic papers are just one avenue of many by
which those invested in the Middle East attempt to find creative solutions to end the
conflict. All of these roads should be taken.

G.A. Res. 67/19, supra note 9.
Laura M. Olson, Practical Challenges of Implementing the Complementarity Between International
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law – Demonstrated by the Procedural Regulation of Internment in NonInternational Armed Conflict, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 437, 455-56 (2009).
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